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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ETATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
)

Plairtiff-Respondent,)
)

v.

)

Case No. 15307

)

JAHES W. BRADLEY,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant. )
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATE11ENT OF 'THE NATURE OF THE Cl,SE
This was an action brought by the State of t:tah against
the Appellant for the offense of criminal homicide in violation
of Title 76, Section 5, Paragraph 207, Utah Code Pnnotated,
1953 as amended, wherein the Appellant was accused of causing
the death of another person while operating a motor V€·hicle in
a negligent manner while under the influence of intoxice<ting
liquor.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried by a jury in Davis County before
District Judge '!'hornley K. Swan on Hay 26 and 27, 1977.

The

Appellant was found not suilty of criminal homicide as chars-ed
in the information, but was found guilty of running a red light,
and guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.

The court sentenced the Appellant to a term of six

months in the Davis courty .Cail and to pay

2

fine of $299.00

by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appe~ls.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Th~ Appellant seeks reversal of th~

· d

J u gments render.

against him or, in the cdtErnative, a remanc'. to the lower cour:
for a new trial consistant with due process.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tl1is action arose out of an automobile accident Whic:
occurred on 2eptember 11, 1976 at zpproximately 6:15p.m., at:
intersection

of State Road No. 106 and Center Streets, in Nor:

Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah.

StatE: Road Nc,, 106 runs in a

north- south direction and Center Street runs northeasterly and
soughwesterly.
light.

The intersection is controlled by a traffic

At approximately 11:30 a.m.,

(T. 224), on the morning

of the accident the Appellant arrived at the maintEnance shop
of the construction company for whom he was employed.
fied

He testi

(T. 224), that between 11:30 a.m., and 5:45p.m., thatdat

be had consumed four or five beers while working on his truck.
He left the shop shortly before 5:45 p.m., travE·ling several
b1ocks to

his brother-in-law's home where he consumed some chi:l

(T. 224).

He then started home, driving south on State Road!(

The pickup truck he was driving hit a vehicle e.?.stbound on Cer.t
Street in the controlled intersection.

The driver of the other

vehicle died as a result of injuries sustc:ined in that accident
utah Highway Pcctrol Trooper ['aryl W. Durrant, testified (T. 64l
that he arrived at the accident scene at approximately 6:22 p.r

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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after having been informed of the accident en his radio.

Upon

his arrival at the scene he c:ssisted in the, removc:l of the
injured parties.

He testified that he noticed an ordor of alcohol

about the Appellant; he, therefore, demonstrated and gave the
the Appellant a "field sobriet) test,"

(T. 65, 66) which con-

sisted of many mc:neuvers in which the Appellant was asked to
stand with his feet and knees toge-,ther with his arrr.s outstretched,
close his eyes, and tilt his head back.
the Appellant swayed unsteadily.

He testified 'T. 69),

He then asked the Appellant

tc perform a finger to nose test with his left and then his right
hand and he testified (T. 70) ttat the Appellant touched his
finger to his upper lip instead of his nose.

Officer Durrant

then asked the Appellant t.o walk an imaginary line, and on command,
turn on his heel and return to the: starting point.

He testified

(T. 71), the Appellant was walking the line "a fairly good job
until he turned around, and at that time he lost his balance and
he had to step backwards to catch himself."

Officer Durrant also

asked the l\ppellant (T. 71) to walk around a flashlight which
had been placed on the ground in an upright position while bent
over.

He testified (T. 72) the Appellant was able to go around

the flashlight: only t-v.·ice and would have fallen had not the
officer caught him.

Trooper Durrant completed his investigation

c:.t tte accident scene <md ther, took the AppeUant (T. 74) to his
employer's shop on Cudahy Lane, and then to the Davis County Jail.
Trooper Durrant asked the Appellant at 8:40 p.m.,

(T. 97) to take

at
to ofhim
administered
which
test"
a "breathalyzer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
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on the evening of the accident.

Test results taken on the

Si:evenson Corporation Breathalyzer, Model 900, reported a rels
of .06 and were admitted into eviderce c:s Exhibit "I"
Eoth Officer ~hlls
~ho ~as at

(T • l7Si

(a North Salt Lake Pc•l ;ce Of
~

the scene at the time of the accident) , and

ficer

Officer

Durrant testified that in his c:pinion Appellant was unC',er the
influence of alcohol.
At trial, other indications th<:•t Appellant had been
drivinq under the influence of alcohol were brought out, such
as empty beer cans

(T. 19).

As foundation,wit~ respect to his testimony conce~~
thE: breathaly;:er rest:l ts and alcohol burnoff rates, Lt.
G. Knight gave testimony
expert.

concernin~

New~ll

his qualifications c:s an

He testified as to his position of Technical Supervis'

of Chemical

~esting

for the State of Utah and to his extensiw

training and experience with respect tc. breathalyzer machines a:
related matters

He also testified that he wu

(T. 105-108).

personally involved with numerous controlled experiments to
ascertain t.he c.bsorption and burnoff rates and that tre breath·
alyzer machines were used in conjunction with
(T.

t~ese

exferimento

239-241).
~Jith

respect to his expert testirrony, Dr. Terry Rich

testified that he was the Deputy '1edical Exardner for the Stat'
of Utah and that he was a medical doctor and had had special
pathological training (T. 153).

Dr. Rich also testified

t~t

Sponsored
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S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization provided
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off rates.
The trial court was satisfied with these qualifications
and admitted the expert testimony as t

0

the probable content of

intoxicants in the blood of the Appellant at the time of the
accident.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THERE lvAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A
CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL.
In State v. Peterson, 21 Utah 2d 36, 210 P.2d 229
(1949), the evidence concerning intoxication was disputed.
Tlle trial court, in response to a request t.y defendant for a
directed verdict summarily stated "lve see no r.erit to Appellant's
second point.

The evidence of intoxication is in conflict.

That

is for the jury to determine."
The law is clear that circumstantial evidence, if probative and believable, is sufficient for a conviction of driving
while intcxicated.

It is equc.lly clear that an appellate court 'WOn't

substitute its judgment for that of the jury's.
v. Fields, 176 N.E. 2d 845 11960).

State of Ohio

With respect to the charge

of driving while intoxicated, 42 A.L.R. at 1507 states the
general policy th<•t "Where there is evidence in the' record from
which the jury may infer th<•t the accused drove ... while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, a conviction will not
he disturbed on appeal, though there is also evidence in the
record to the contrary."

49 l'.• L.R. at 1397 states "Where the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence reasonably supports the

d. t
·
ver lC , lts wE:-ight and cred-

ibility is for t~e jury, and, in the absence of unusual

ci.r-

cumstances, the court will not set aside a judgment for insu~
ficiency of the evidence."
If there is some believable evidence, then it is
the jury's sole province to hear all the evidence, to deter~~
tt.e credibility of the ,_.i tresses, to obsc:rve the demeanor of th,
witnesses and the defendant, to give the evidence what ~eight
it determines, and to make a final determination as to the f~l
of the case.
In this case, there is an abundancoo, of evidence inak~

dicating that Appellant was driving under the influence of
at the tirre of the accident.

Appellant stated to Trooper Durrar

that he had been drinking that day

(T. 66, 224).

Five empty

cans of Coors beer, three empty cartons or containers and eight
unopened cans of beer were found in Appellant's tn;ck after the
accident.

Officer Hills also testified that when he first ar-

rived at the accident, he saw Appellant standing by the door
of his truck. taking something froFt the• seat and put.tir:.g it behind the seat where the beer was found

(T. 12, 19).

Bott

0~

ficer Mills and Officer Durrant gave their opinions, based bn
their training and actual observations of the l\ppellant at tte
scene that the Appellant was in fact under the: influence of
alcohol (T.

23, 81).

Officer .t-'.ills stated that Appellant was

belligerent and wouldn't cooperate at one point (T.21).
Durrant
smelled the odor of alcohol about the Appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Officer

was told by the Appellant that he had been drinking (T. 66) .
Appellant performed in~dequately on actual field tests demonstrated by Officer Durrant (T. 67-72), which could have benefited him.

Breathalyzer results fron a test ad!'".inistered

approximately three hours and fifty minutes after the accident
showed a blood alcohol level of .06 (T. 175), but \~as

ob,·iously

not the sole consideration of tr,e jury in a two-day trial.
The: evidence presented by tte officers and lay witnesses show that the jury made a reasonable dE:cision clearly
within their perogative, and that verdict should be sustained.
In State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d

29~

422 P.2d 196,

197 (1967) this court stated:
It is cur duty to respect thE; perogative
of the jury as the exclusive judges of
credibj.lity of the witnesses and as the
determiners of the facts. Consequently we
assure that ttey believed the state's
evidence, and \":e survey it, together with
all fair inferences that the jury could
reasonably draw therefrom, in the light
rr,ost favorable to their verdict.
In this particular case the jury, pursuant to all of the instruction give to them by the court, made a fair determination.
In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212, 215
(1957), in which Sullivan hctd been convicted of second degree
burglary .:md on appeal argued that the evidence WCJ.s not sufficient to sustain the: verdict, the Supreme Court c:.ffirmed the conviction stc:.ting the general principles of law:
Before a verdict may properly be set
aside it must appear that. the evidence
s~ Law
inconclusive
or unsatisfactory
Sponsored by thewas
S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
thcttLibrary
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minds
actingby the
fairly
Services and Technology
Act, administered
Utah State upon
Library.
OCR, mayreasonable
contain errors.
it must haveMachine-generated
entertained

doubt that cefendants committed the
crime.
Unless the evidence comrels
such conclusion as a matter of law,
the ,-~relet must stand. The very essence
of trl~l b~ Jury lS th~t the jury are the
excluslve :ud9es of the weight of the
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses
and the facts to he found therefrom.
(Emphasis added) .
Point II
'IHE l,DMISSION OF THE BEEATHJ\LYZER RESULTS
AND THE ACCOMPANYING EXPERT TESTIMONY INTO
EVIDENCE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The tr~al judge was satisfied that the foundation
laid for the admission of the breathalyzer results was adeq~~
and ttat the experts for the State who testified were sufficie·
qualified to testify.
Breatt.alyzer results are overv;helmingly accepted acr:
the country as competent evidence when proper procedures are
followed.

It wus clearly estc:blished in this case that the·

breathalyzer machine was in proper working order and that the
test was administered properly.
As to the admissibility of expert testimony, Utc:.h b .
is quite clear.

In State Road Commission v. Silliman, 22 Utah

2d 233, 448 P.2d 347 (196ru it is stated:
The qualification of an expert witness
is to be determined by the trial judge,
and if he determines that a witness by
reason of training and experience can
assist the jury by giving an opinion on
a matter properly before the court, we
on appeal should not hold that testirrony
should be stricken unless such palpable
ignorance of the subject mat~er.is manifested by the witress as to lndlcate an
abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
trial judge.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

In Lamb. v. Bangart, 525 F.2o 602, this court said:
The_trial court is allowed considerable
lat1tude of di~cretion in the 2d~issibility
of expert test1mony, and in the 2bscnce of a
clear showing of abuse, this court will
not reverse.
A challenge to tre reliability
of such expert testimony will be considered
as not i~v'?l :ring it~ compet.ency bt<t its weight
~nd cred1b1l1ty, whlch is a matter for tte
]ury to determine.
With respect to his testimony concerning the breccthalyzer machine and results and alcoho}. burnoff rates, Lt. Newell
G. Knight save extensive testimony concerning his qualifications
as an expert.

He testified as to his position of Technical

supervisor of Chemical Testing for the: State of Utah and to his
eJ:tensive trainin<J and experience wi.th bre2,thc;lyzer machines c:.nd
related matters (T. 105-108).

He also testified that he was per-

sonally involved with numerous controlled experiments to ascertain alcohol absorption and burnoff rates 2nd that breathalyzer
machines were used in conjunction with these experiments (T. 239/41) •

or. Terry Rich testified that he was tte Deputy Medical Examiner fer the State of Utah and the<t he was a medical
doct.or and had had special pat.hological training IT. 153).

Dr.

Rich also testified that he had training and experience as to
toxicology 2nd alcohol burnoff rates.
The trial cocirt was satisfied with these qualifications
and admitted the exfert testimony and the :ury was properly edmonished and instructed that the real decision was theirs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Certainly the tri-1
J. d
a
u gc d'd
1
nc.t abuse his discrq.
in determinins that the experts' te~timony would he of as~·
· lst,
to the jury.
Appc,llant contends that since the brcatralyzer test
was apprcximately three hours and fifty minutes after the accident, thE: results shouldn't bE admissible into c:vidence.
For practica] reasons, the chem'cal tests are a 1way,
J.

adrni.nistered some time c;,fter a persc:n is arrested.

Due to the

particular circumstances, the delay time alw<Jys varies.

Whe:n

has been a long delay, it has been the practice in this sta~
tc. use expert testimony to relate the test results back to
the time of the accident.

This practice is codified in the~

enactment of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.5 which states:
In any action or preceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was driving
under the influence of alcohol, the results
of a chemical test cr tEsts as authorized in
41-6-44.10 shall be admitted as evidence
if the chemical test ~as taken within one
hour of the alleged incident. The level
of the alcohol determined to be in the blood
by the chemical test shall be presurnc:d to be
not less than the blood alcohol level of
the person at tte time of the incident.
If
the chemical test was not taken within one hour
after the alleged incident, the evidence of
the amount of alcohol in thE: person's blood
as shovm by thE: chemical test is c.drr.issible
if expert testimony establishes its prcbative
value and the results of said test n•ay be
given prima facie effect if established by
e}:pert testimony.
(Emphasis added) .
This has always been the case law in Utah.

In State of

Ut~~

cannc.n, 17 Utah 2d 105, 404 P.2a 971 (1965), this court ovem.
a claim of remoteness and upheld the trial court's c.llowance o'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is a great ceal of case law in other jurisdictions
on this point which is helpful here.

In the absence of clear

statutory language requirins a rElation-back, the apparent
cverwhe,lming view throughout the country is tJ-at breathalyzer
results, if properly administered, are adF.issible even 'l<"ithout
any testimony relating back t.he results.

Any qt<estion of time

or delay betw~en the accident and the administration of the
test simply goes

to the weight of the evidence and is a matter

for the jury's consideration.

These jurisdictions state that

relating bclCk the results is not necessary c:nd that the evidence
by itself without relation-back is competEnt and probative.
see Stateof Idaho v. Sutliff, 547 P.2d 1128 (1976); People of
Michigan v. Kozar, 221 N.W. 2d 170 (1974); State of Arizona
v. City Court of Tucson, 481 P.2d 766 (1971); State of New Hampshire

v. Gallant, 227 A.2d 597 (1967); and Toms v. State of

Oklahoma, 239 P.2d 812 (1952).
These cases cite many other cases which have held
similarly with reported delays beoing over four hours.

State of

Idaho v. Sutliff, State of New Hampshire v. Gallant, and Toms
v. state of Okalhoma (supra),

take note of the fact that ad-·

missibility of test results taken some tirre after the incident
generally favor the defenC'.ant.

State , .. Kezar, supra, st.ates

the obvious realtion-back by experts is permissible even though
it is not required.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-11-OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant states in his brief that tbere m t
us nec<,s.
sarily be a realtion-back citing the Utah Implied Consent ~t
- at
as authority.
The Implied Consent Statute says r.othinc;_ at a]J
concerning realtion-back or delay.
(1917)

utah

co d e

Anne. t a ted 41- _ ,
61

simply allows a rec;.ltion-back by expert testirrony if tr.

test is given more than one hour after the incid 8 nt.

Again

in State of Utah v. Cannon, supra, this court stated t:hctt deJa
In t

is "a matter for expert medical testirrony and the jury."
case, expert testimony was used to relate back the test

res~t

simply to advise the jury.
The State offered testimony of two expert witnesses·.
without question were able tc. establish tJ:-e probative value of
the test results as evidence, ie., they gave testimony

whi~

helped the jury relate back the results of the test to the
of the acc:!.dent if they wanted to.

t~

Deputy Medi.cal Exc:miner,

Terry Rich, gave expert te,stimony as to alchool burnoff rates.
Doctor Rich testified U:at in approximately tl:.ree hours and
fifty minutes an individual who v;ould burn off alcohol at the
lowest end of the "burnoff ran9e" would burn off . 036 percenta
units while c;.n individual at tl:e top of the range viould burn c
.072 percentage units

(T. 171-174).

Thus, the blood alcohol

level approximately three hours and fifty minutes earlier coul
be . 096 to .132 barring other factors.

Another expert, Ne;;eJ:

Knight, also testified concerning burnoff rates and gave his
e>:pert opinion ·that Appellant could not l:ave achieved a breaf
alyzer reading at 9:50p.m., of .06 if he had only consumed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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five beers that day, the first teing consumed at ll:)O a.m.,
and the last at 5:45 p.m.

Any testimony as tc· "burnoff"

could help the defendant.
The facts upon ~·hich the e}:pert opinions were b.:;sed
had been established, ie., that Appellant had nothing tc eat
zll day and had ~llegedly only consumed four or five beers
before leaving work.

Upon leaving work at 5:45p.m., he allegedly

he'd no more alcohol that day.

Appellant went to his broUer-

in-law's home where he consumed "some pieces of chicken."
Within minutes after leaving there, he was involved in the
accident.
rates

(T.

Newell Knight testified concerning alcohol absorption
244-250).

The absorption rate appears to have little

impact with respect to the facts of this case since the alcohol
was all allegedly consumed before Appellant ate the chicken,
as was argued by the defendant.
considered by the jury.

This was only one factor

The evidence of the breath<;lyzer results

and the expert testimony was clearly helpful to the jury.

The

experts' testimony \-cas base-,d on personal exr;.erience and knowledge and facts made known at t.rial.
With respect to the authority cited

~nd

the facts

of this case, it is clear that the admission of the breathalyzer
results and the expert testimony into evidence was not error.
The expert testimony relating back the results

~as

competent

and "helpful" evidence for the :;ury to consider and was properly
admitted asbeing within the judge's discretion and not prejudicial when taken in the light of a two-day trial and substantial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN INSTRUCTING
THE .:-URY AS TO THE STATUTOfcY PLESU1PTIONS
Bt.SED ON BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVEL.

As indicated in Point II, if tre test is given

"'·Ore

than one hot<r after thE alleged i.ncident and expert tEstitrony
establishes some probative value of the results, those resulb
are given prirra fzcie effect and nonconclusive
are applicaole.

pres~mtpions

If the test is given vithin one hour

oft~

incident, then expert testimony is not required fe-r the presumptions to be applicabje.

Again, it is helpfcl to review

the law in other jurisdictions.
510 P. 2d 1079

State of New Mexico v. Tru'il:

(1973), states that the presumption i.nstnction

is proper if the implied consent statute has been complied ;;it:
In thE· case at bar, Utah 1 s Implied Consent StatutE was comolie(
with in every respect.

State of Idaho v. Sutliff, sunrc:, states

We hold that this statute does not require
extrapolation back but establishes that the
percentage of blood alcohol as shov;n by
chemical analysis relates back to the time
of the alleged offense for purposes of applying the statutory presumption.
This holding is in accord with those of oth8r jurisdictions who have considered the question.
The statute referred to is Idaho 1 s "presumption" stat.ute whose.
language "at the time of the alleged offense" is exactly simile:
t.o tl'.e language in Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 which statEs
"at the time alleged."

The court goes on tc- give other citatic

and the reasons for its decision.
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Appellant in his brief states "The legislature has
since this occasion e-,nlarged the presumption to hold over for
an r.our after the time of driving.

At thE, tirre of the crime

herein charged, there was no such holdover pe-,riod. •

Appellant

purportedly wants us to believe thcct befcre the 1977 amendment
of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.5, expert testimony was required
even within the one-hour period.

The logical conclusion from

case law is that the presumptions h<cve 2.lw<:1ys c:.pplied even without relation-back testimony and that the requirements of Utah
code Annotated 41-6-44.5 with respect to e>:pert testimony if the
time period is greater than one hour, is sirrply a codification
of the comrnon-lav: principles of evidence which are simply an
attempt to get all truthful and helpful evidence before a jury.
In any event., the: State of Utah in this case offered
expert testimony rE:lating back the results.
It is urged by Respondent that

~:.nder

pre-1977 Utah

law, a presumption instruction is proper even without relating
back test results.

Furthermore, even if the court decides re-

lation-back testimony was required, Respondent has duly complied
ar.d, therefore, a presumption instruction .,·as not prejudicial error
in light of the entire case.
It should be noted here that the presumption instruction
was simply stated as being part of tbe applicable law, and left
the decision t.o the jury.

It started, "If the:re vias at the time

... " (T. 257), without c;_uestion, "if" leaves discretion to the"jury.
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The judge was careful to expalin the natue of the nre~umt
.
1
~
Plon,
l_

ie.

1

that it was not conclusive but to be considered alona '··'.
y;.._

J

the rest of the evidence

(T.

258).

reasonable doubt notion many times

t:.

ThE· judge also exr: lainec; t'.
(T.

258).

It cannot be said that thE· Instructions un 1 aw"·ully
r
prejudiced Appellant in any wv.y.

In instruction No. 1 the,

jury was admonished to e):ercise sincere judgment.

In No.

3

the:y were e<drr.onished not to take the instr·uctions as a statE,ment of the facts.

Instruction No. 51 which is the instn.ctio"

comp1.ained of by the Appellant, also has a paragraph in it
stating "If you bE>lieve" with a sub~;equent instruction to tte
jury to weigh the evidence.

Of course, they were instructed

that they must find "beyond a reasonable doubt" the elemenb
of the offense.

Instruction No.

13 was to the effect t.hat

c:.ny possible presumptions raised were to be applied only to
the time-: thc:•t the defendant was driving a motor vehicle <md
that the presumptions must be so proved "to your satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt by competent. and believable evidence:
They were also advised to determine the issues they must consider all of the facts immediately proceeding and surrounding
the occurrence and not to be P"<OVe:·d to a conclusion solely by'
the fact of an unfortunate result.

They were instructed that

the Appellant was presumed to be• innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Instruction Nc.. 18, the jury

was instructed that they were the sole judges of the weight
of the evidence and U:.e credibility of the ..,,i tnesses and the
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facts.

They were also told

th~t they may consider any interest

or bias that any witness may or may not have.
were to!d "You are not bound to believe

Also, they

all that the witnesses

may tave testified to nor are you bound to believe any witness;
you may believe one witness as against many or many
one.

2

s against

In t.he light of the above observations, it is your privi-

lege to judge the weight to be given to the testimony of tt.e
witnesses and tc determine what the facts are."
Instruction No.

(Emphasis added).

20 on expert opinions stated, "You

~re not bound, however, by such an opinion.

Give it the weight

to which you deem it entitled, whether that. be: great or slight,
and you may reject it if, in your judgement, the: reasons for it
a1 e unsound. "

Therefore, we submit that the trial court did not
error in its instructions to the jury with respect to the expert
testimony offered and even if there v;as errcr, the error was
certainly not prejudicial to the defendant.

In fact, we submit

that the expert testimony taken, because of tte time elements
involved, could have ::;ust as easily helped the P.ppellant's case
as it could have possibly prejudiced it.
CONCLUSION
We,. the;refore, submit to this Honorable Court that
there was sufficient evidence fer the jury to convict the Appellant of the offense that he was sentenced for ty tte Trial
court.

we also truly conclude th<•t the expert testimony as to
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valved, was prcperly

weighe~

by the jury.

The jury was able

to consider the demeanor of tte parties and the witnesses

a~

they were properly instructed by the Trial court to

~o;eigh

all

of that evidence in order to render thEir verdict.

The court

properly left the perogative and the decision with the jury
and, therefore, since the Appellant got a fair trial,

this~

should not overturn that jury verdict.
Respectfully subn;itted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
BRUCE M. HALE
Assistant Attorney Gener2l
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